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Dopamine neurons are well known for signaling reward-prediction errors. In this issue, Matsumoto and
Takada (2013) show that some dopamine neurons also signal salient events during progression through a
visual search task requiring working memory and sustained attention.Imagine yourself on the hunt. This could
be the hunt for the last vegetarian option
at a department lunch or for a rare first
edition of Darwin’s ‘‘On the Expression
of Emotions in Man and Animals’’ at a
local flea market. Either way, the search
is on, and all of your senses are bent
toward that single goal. But what exactly
is it that drives you? What in your brain
is responsible for that sense ofmotivation,
a drive perhaps independent of your relish
at the attainment of the goal? What sets
your expectations, registers themismatch
between anticipation and experience,
and makes sure you don’t waste time on
a worthless search again? And what,
above all, is facilitating the laser-like
intensity with which your eyes—sifting,
sorting, homing in—scan the world
around you? The answer, of course, is
complicated. It is complicated because
it is biology. But there is also a simple
answer, one that comes up over and
over in studies of what drives us. That
answer is dopamine.
For more than a decade, dopamine has
been the darling of cognitive and systems
neuroscience. Synthesized by only a few
neurons (a mere 400,000) in the midbrain
but projected broadly across the telen-
cephalon, it has come to play an outsizedrole in our thinking about learning, mem-
ory, movement, and motivation. This
stems in part from the key role it plays in
maladies such as Parkinson’s disease,
addiction, and schizophrenia, but also
from the emergence in the late 1990s of
highly influential computational theories
of its function (Berridge and Robinson,
1998; Schultz et al., 1997). Yet
despite the highly structured connectivity
patterns of midbrain dopamine neurons
(Haber and Knutson, 2010), most theories
have posited a single, unified role for their
function.
The last few years, however, have
witnessed a newwave of findings demon-
strating previously neglected diversity in
dopamine function, picking up on earlier
observations that dopaminergic cells
respond to salient events (Bromberg-
Martin et al., 2010; Horvitz, 2000; Matsu-
moto and Hikosaka, 2009; Redgrave and
Gurney, 2006) and perhaps even aversive
outcomes (Fiorillo, 2013; Horvitz, 2000;
Matsumoto and Hikosaka, 2009). These
findings raise the possibility that dopa-
mine release might subserve multiple
functions, conveying different signals to
different parts of the brain in order to
meet a variety of behavioral demands.
Yet a clear delineation of what functionsthese disparate signals perform has
been lacking.
In this issue, Matsumoto and Takada
(2013) set out to remedy this gap by
studying the diversity of dopamine
signaling across the midbrain during
cognitive performance. To do this, they
recorded single neurons from the ventral
tegmental area (VTA) and substantia
nigra pars compacta (SNc) in monkeys
performing a visual search task for fluid
reward. On most trials, monkeys were
first shown a cue indicating whether a
large or small reward would be delivered
for a correct response. This cue was
followed by a sample stimulus (a slanted
line). The monkeys were then shown an
array of slanted lines (two, four, or six
items), among which they had to search
for a match to the sample stimulus.
Monkeys indicated a match by visually
fixating the matching target.
Previous work has shown that dopa-
mine is necessary for maintaining working
memory (Li and Mei, 1994; Sawaguchi
and Goldman-Rakic, 1991, 1994; Wata-
nabe et al., 1997; Williams and Goldman-
Rakic, 1995), as well as for facilitating
visual perception (Noudoost and Moore,
2011), and thus might be released in
response to the display of the targeteptember 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 831
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Figure 1. Dopamine Neurons Respond to Events in a Working-Memory Task
(A) Putative dopaminergic neurons in both SNc and VTA respond more strongly to cues predicting
high-reward trials than to those predicting low-reward trials.
(B) Cells in the dorsolateral SNc respond to the presentation of a visual stimulus when that stimulus must
be maintained in working memory, but not when it is irrelevant to task performance.
(C) Cells respond more strongly to the onset of smaller, easier search arrays than to larger, more difficult
arrays. Responsive cells are more strongly concentrated in the medial SNc and VTA.
(D) Cells respond more strongly to the location of a search target when that target is located in a larger
(more difficult) array. More red indicates a stronger population response.
All comparisons are relative within vertical columns.
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when the information in the sample stim-
ulus is needed for the upcoming search.
To test this, the authors interleaved
blocks of the match-to-sample task with
blocks of a second visual search task. In
this second task, a slanted line stimulus
was again presented, but the search array
consisted of unrelated shapes (triangles
and squares). The monkey’s task was
then simply to locate the lone triangle,
which ‘‘popped out’’ from the array. For
this task, the initial stimulus was un-
necessary, and no working memory was
required.
The results of Matsumoto and
Takada’s experiment are summarized in
Figure 1. As expected, dopamine neurons
responded more strongly to the cue
advertising a large reward than to the
cue for a small reward (A). More impor-
tantly, cells responded much more
strongly to the sample stimulus when it
was needed for the upcoming search
than when it was irrelevant, suggesting
that dopamine release from midbrain
neurons contributes to the working mem-
ory requirements of the match-to-sample
task (B). In addition, dopamine cells fired
more strongly to the onset of smaller,832 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 Eleasier arrays than to larger, harder ones
(C) and responded more strongly when
monkeys found targets in large arrays
than in small ones (D). These results are
consistent with conventional motiva-
tion or reward prediction theories, which
predict a smaller dopamine release for a
lower probability of reward (large arrays)
and a larger dopamine release when a
low reward is actually obtained (large ar-
rays again). However, the target choice
signals Matsumoto and Takada observed
occurred after the monkeys fixated the
target but before delivery of the reward,
implying that these, too, encoded an
expectation of reward. In fact, the same
signals were present in trials where the
monkeys made incorrect choices, con-
sistent with the interpretation that they
reflected monkeys’ subjective expecta-
tions rather than the reward outcome or
a prediction error.
The authors’ most intriguing finding
resulted from an analysis of which neural
responses were present in which cells.
Although nearly all cells responded to
the onset of the reward cue, cells re-
sponding to the sample stimulus were
found almost entirely in dorsal and lateral
regions of the midbrain, probably withinsevier Inc.the SNc. By contrast, cells responsive to
the size of the search array were more
concentrated in medial and ventral re-
gions, and there was a correlation
between effect size and recording depth,
most likely in the VTA. Such a gradient in
function is broadly consistent with known
anatomy: the SNc projects primarily to
dorsolateral sensorimotor structures,
whereas the VTA projects primarily to
medial and limbic cortical areas associ-
ated with learning and motivation (Haber
and Knutson, 2010). These observations
endorse the authors’ conclusion that
responses to the sample cue facilitate
working memory by releasing dopamine
in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
They are likewise consistent with the
observation that factors influencing task
difficulty are processed preferentially by
systems responsible for calculating moti-
vation and reward anticipation.
In addition to these tantalizing findings,
the study also raises a number of impor-
tant questions. Because the authors
used spike waveforms to identify putative
dopaminergic cells and recorded only
firing-rate responses, they could not
verify the actual amount of dopamine
released in response to task events;
such verification could be provided by
techniques such as voltammetry, which
measures catecholamine release with
millisecond precision. Furthermore, the
difficulty of recording from small brain-
stem regions limited the number of cells
recorded—enough so to suggest a
gradient in function, perhaps, but the
findings will benefit from replication.
Finally, although both the location and
timing of cell firing in response to the
sample cue are consistent with the
hypothesis that subsequent dopamine
release facilitates working memory, future
studies will need to verify this causally,
perhaps by showing that selective activa-
tion or inactivation of lateral SNc neurons
has an effect on the performance of
working memory.
What is most exciting about the work
by Matsumoto and Takada is the finding
that dopamine signaling in the brain is
more heterogeneous and computa-
tionally specific than commonly thought.
Their work shows that what has long
been known anatomically is also true
functionally, and it challenges other
scientists to begin working out the means
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specific dopamine signaling. Just as
importantly, the finding that dopamine
neuron responses track cognitive func-
tion could prove to be valuable for our
understanding of Parkinson’s disease, in
which dopaminergic medications used
for the control of motor symptoms are
sometimes accompanied by cognitive
side effects. Further work delineating
the separate cognitive, motor, and
learning signals in the SNc and VTA
might eventually lead to better treat-
ments that preferentially target dopa-
mine’s role in movement while sparing
patients’ cognitive abilities. Yet much re-
mains to be done. For a long while yet, it
appears, the tiny dopaminergic midbrainwill continue to demand a large body
of work.
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Visual objects tend to be found in predictable combinations (e.g., pens with paper). How does the brain
represent these regularities? In this issue of Neuron, Stansbury et al. (2013) use fMRI to study the brain’s
representation of visual scene categories.In a 1942 essay, Jorge Luis Borges
discusses the categorization of animals,
purportedly found in a fictitious Chinese
encyclopedia named the ‘‘Celestial
Empire of Benevolent Knowledge’’
(Borges, 1942). Animals therein are
classified into 14 fanciful categories,
including, ‘‘fabulous ones,’’ ‘‘those that
have just broken the flower vase,’’ and
‘‘those that look like flies when viewed
from a distance.’’ Borges uses this
example to suggest that any attempt
to categorize the contents of nature is
‘‘arbitrary and full of conjectures.’’
Nevertheless (again quoting Borges),
‘‘the impossibility of penetrating the
divine scheme of the universe cannot
dissuade us from outlining human
schemes, even though we are aware
that they are provisional.’’ In fact, such
schemes can be quite useful in sensoryneuroscience. A decade after Borges’s
essay, Barlow (1953) discovered neurons
that respond selectively to stimuli that
look like flies when viewed from a dis-
tance. These ‘‘fly detectors’’ were found
in the retinas of frogs and, hence, were
linked to a specific category of behavior
(feeding). Subsequently, Hubel and
Wiesel (1962) identified visual cortical
cells that were described as ‘‘simple’’
and ‘‘complex,’’ and these turned out to
be useful labels for understanding many
aspects of the visual cortex from anatomy
to computation.
More recent imaging studies have led
to the suggestion that neurons with
particular stimulus selectivities are clus-
tered together, forming brain modules
responsible for encoding rather abstract
categories of stimuli, including faces
(Tsao et al., 2006), places (Epstein andKanwisher, 1998), and buildings (Hasson
et al., 2003). Of course, the number of
such categories must be far greater than
the number of brain regions, which leads
to the profound question of how the brain
organizes such a vast quantity of visual
experience. In this issue of Neuron,
Stansbury et al. (2013) address this
question.
Stansbury et al. (2013) used fMRI
imaging of human subjects to study the
brain’s representation of visual scene
categories, defined as classes of images
that contain similar co-occurrences of
individual objects. For example, a scene
that contains a building and a car is
more likely to belong to the category
‘‘cityscape’’ than to the category
‘‘nautical.’’ Obviously, one object (e.g.,
a tree) can be found in more than one
scene (e.g., cityscape and rural), andeptember 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 833
